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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a cognitive radio network
that consists of one cognitive base station (CBS) and multiple
cognitive users (CUs) in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
where CUs transmit their data packets to CBS under a primary
user’s quality of service (QoS) constraint while the eavesdroppers
attempt to intercept the cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS.
We investigate the physical-layer security against eavesdropping
attacks in the cognitive radio network and propose the user
scheduling scheme to achieve multiuser diversity for improving
the security level of cognitive transmissions with a primary QoS
constraint. Specifically, a cognitive user (CU) that satisfies the pri-
mary QoS requirement and maximizes the achievable secrecy rate
of cognitive transmissions is scheduled to transmit its data packet.
For the comparison purpose, we also examine the traditional
multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes. We analyze
the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability of the
traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as well
as the artificial noise scheme in Rayleigh fading environments.
Numerical results show that given a primary QoS constraint, the
proposed multiuser scheduling scheme generally outperforms the
traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes
in terms of the achievable secrecy rate and intercept probability.
In addition, we derive the diversity order of the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme through an asymptotic intercept
probability analysis and prove that the full diversity is obtained
by using the proposed multiuser scheduling.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, multiuser scheduling,
cognitive radio, achievable secrecy rate, intercept probability,
diversity order.
I. INTRODUCTION
COGNITIVE radio has been recognized as a promisingtechnology that enables unlicensed secondary users (also
known as cognitive users) to dynamically access the licensed
spectrum that is assigned to but not being used by primary
users (PUs) [1]-[3]. In cognitive radio, PUs have a higher
priority in accessing the licensed spectrum than cognitive
users (CUs). At present, there are two main cognitive radio
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paradigms: 1) overlay cognitive radio [4], [5], in which CUs
first identify the white space of the licensed spectrum (called
spectrum hole) through spectrum sensing and then utilize the
detected spectrum hole for data transmission; and 2) underlay
cognitive radio [6], [7], in which CUs and PUs are allowed
to simultaneously access the licensed spectrum as long as
the quality of service (QoS) of PUs is not affected. Recent
years have witnessed an increasing interest on the cognitive
radio topic which has been studied extensively from different
perspectives (see [8] and references therein).
Cognitive radio security has been attracting continuously
growing attention, due to the open and dynamic nature of
cognitive radio architecture where various unknown wireless
devices are allowed to opportunistically access the licensed
spectrum, which makes cognitive radio systems vulnerable
to malicious attacks. Recently, considerable research efforts
have been devoted to the cognitive radio security against the
primary user emulation (PUE) attack [9] and denial-of-service
(DoS) attack [10]. More specifically, a PUE attacker attempts
to emulate a primary user (PU) and transmits signals with
the same characteristics as the PU, which constantly prevents
CUs from accessing the spectrum. In contrast, a DoS attacker
intentionally transmits any signals (not necessarily emulating
the PU’s signal characteristics) to generate interference and
disrupt the legitimate user communications. It needs to be
pointed out that both the PUE and DoS attackers transmit
harmful active signals which can be detected by authorized
users and then prevented with certain strategies. In addition to
the active PUE and DoS attackers, an eavesdropper is a passive
attacker that attempts to intercept the legitimate transmissions,
which is typically undetectable since the eavesdropper keeps
silent without transmitting any active signals. Traditionally,
the cryptographic techniques relying on secret keys have
been employed to protect the communication confidentiality
against eavesdropping attacks, which, however, increases the
computational and communication overheads and introduces
additional system complexity for the secret key distribution
and management.
As an alternative, physical-layer security is now emerging
as a new secure communication means to defend against
eavesdroppers by exploiting the physical characteristics of
wireless channels. This work was pioneered by Shannon in
[11] and further extended by Wyner in [12], where a so-called
secrecy capacity is developed from an information-theoretical
prospective and shown as the difference between the capacity
of the channel from source to destination (referred to as main
link) and that of the channel from source to eavesdropper
(called wiretap link). It was proved in [13] that if the ca-
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pacity of the main link is less than that of the wiretap link,
the eavesdropper will succeed in decoding the source signal
and an intercept event occurs in this case. To improve the
physical-layer security of wireless transmissions, some recent
work was proposed by exploiting the multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) [14]-[16] and cooperative relays [17], [18].
It was shown that the secrecy capacity significantly increases
through the use of MIMO and user cooperation techniques.
Notice that the aforementioned work [14]-[18] addresses the
traditional non-cognitive radio networks and the physical-layer
security against eavesdropping attacks is rarely investigated
for cognitive radio networks. Compared to traditional wireless
networks, there are some unique challenges to be addressed
for the physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks,
e.g., the PU’s QoS protection issue and the mitigation of
mutual interference between PUs and CUs. More specifically,
when applying the MIMO and user cooperation techniques for
physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks, we need to
consider how to avoid causing additional harmful interference
to PUs. This requires certain modification of the conventional
MIMO and user cooperation mechanisms for protecting the
PUs’ QoS while maximizing the cognitive radio security.
In this paper, we explore the physical-layer security in
a cognitive radio network consisting of one cognitive base
station (CBS) and multiple cognitive users (CUs), where
multiple eavesdroppers are assumed to intercept the cognitive
transmissions from CUs to CBS. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows. Firstly, we propose
the multiuser scheduling scheme to achieve multiuser diver-
sity for improving the cognitive transmission security against
eavesdropping attacks, in which a cognitive user (CU) that
maximizes the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmis-
sions is scheduled for data transmission under the PU’s QoS
constraint. Secondly, we examine the traditional multiuser
scheduling [19], [20] and the artificial noise scheme [21], [22]
for the purpose of comparison with the proposed multiuser
scheduling. Also, we evaluate the security performance of
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as
well as the artificial noise scheme in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate and intercept probability. Finally, we conduct the
diversity order analysis and show that the proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme achieves the diversity order of M , where
M represents the number of CUs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model of cognitive transmissions in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In Section III, we propose
the multiuser scheduling scheme for cognitive transmissions
to defend against eavesdropping attacks and analyze the
achievable secrecy rate in Rayleigh fading channels. For the
comparison purpose, we also present the traditional multiuser
scheduling and the artificial noise schemes and analyze their
achievable secrecy rates. Section IV conducts the intercept
probability analysis of the multiuser scheduling and the ar-
tificial noise schemes and shows the security advantage of
the proposed multiuser scheduling approach over the artificial
noise scheme. Next, Section V presents the diversity order
analysis and proves the full diversity achieved by the pro-
posed multiuser scheduling scheme. Finally, we provide some
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Fig. 1. Coexistence of a primary network consisting of one primary
transmitter (PT) and one primary receiver (PR) with a cognitive radio network
consisting of one cognitive base station (CBS) and M cognitive users (CUs)
in the presence of N eavesdroppers.
concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In cognitive radio networks, CUs are allowed to access
the licensed spectrum that is assigned to PUs and mutual
interference typically exists between CUs and PUs. As shown
in Fig. 1, we consider a cognitive radio network that consists of
one CBS and M CUs, e.g., an IEEE 802.22 wireless regional
area network (WRAN) [2] where a CBS serves multiple
customer premise equipments (CPEs) which are also known as
CUs. In Fig. 1, N eavesdroppers are assumed to intercept the
cognitive transmissions from CUs to CBS, where all nodes are
equipped with single antenna and the solid and dash lines rep-
resent the main and wiretap links, respectively. For notational
convenience, M CUs and N eavesdroppers are denoted by
U = {Ui|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M} and E = {Ej |j = 1, 2, · · · , N},
respectively. Throughout this paper, we assume the underlay
cognitive radio, i.e., when PT is transmitting to PR over a
spectrum band, a CU is also allowed to transmit its data to
CBS over the same band at the same time as long as the PU’s
QoS is not affected. In order to protect the PU’s QoS, the
interference received at PR shall be guaranteed not to exceed
the maximum tolerable level denoted by I through limiting
the transmit power of CUi (Pi), yielding
Pi =
I
|hip|2
, (1)
where hip represents the fading coefficient of the channel
from CUi to PR. As shown in Eq. (1), for the PU’s QoS
protection, the transmit power of a cognitive user becomes
a random variable, which leads to some new challenges in
the resultant secrecy rate and intercept probability analysis.
Due to the mutual interference between primary and cognitive
transmissions [3], the interference will also be received at
CBS from PT. As discussed in [23] and [24], the interference
caused by PT to CBS can be modeled as a Gaussian random
process, since the primary signal is typically processed at
CBS with non-coherent detection. Moreover, the thermal noise
follows a complex Gaussian distribution, which makes the
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interference plus noise at CBS become a complex normal
random variable with zero mean and variance Nb as denoted
by CN (0, Nb), where subscript b denotes CBS. Similarly, the
interference and noise received at an eavesdropper Ej can
also be modeled as a complex normal random variable with
zero mean and variance Nej where Ej ∈ E . In the cognitive
radio network, CBS is regarded as a centralized controller
and its associated CUs access the licensed spectrum using
an orthogonal multiple access method such as the orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) as specified in
IEEE 802.22 network [2]. Considering that CUi transmits its
signal xi with power I|hip|2 , the received signal at CBS is given
by
yb =
√
I
|hip|2
hibxi + nb, (2)
where hib represents the fading coefficient of channel from
CUi to CBS and nb ∼ CN (0, Nb) denotes the interference
and thermal noise received at CBS. Meanwhile, due to the
broadcast nature of wireless medium, the eavesdroppers can
overhear the transmission from CUi to CBS. Following the
physical-layer security literature (see [15]-[18] and references
therein), we assume that the eavesdroppers are aware of all the
parameters of the cognitive transmission from CUi to CBS
including the carrier frequency, spectrum bandwidth, coding
and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm, and so on,
except that the source signal xi is confidential. Hence, the
received signal at eavesdropper Ej is given by
yej =
√
I
|hip|2
hiejxi + nej , (3)
where hiej represents the fading coefficient of the channel
from CUi to Ej and nej ∼ CN (0, Nej ) denotes the inter-
ference and thermal noise received at eavesdropper Ej . In
this paper, we assume that N eavesdroppers independently
perform their tasks to intercept the cognitive transmission. If
none of N eavesdroppers succeeds in decoding the source
signal, the cognitive transmission from CUi to CBS is secure;
otherwise, the cognitive transmission is not secure and an
intercept event is considered to occur in this case. Both the
main and wiretap links as shown in Fig. 1 are modeled
as Rayleigh fading channels, i.e., |hip|2, |hib|2 and |hiej |2
follow exponential distributions with means σ2ip, σ2ib and
σ2iej , respectively. Although only Rayleigh fading channels are
considered throughout this paper, similar performance analysis
and results can be obtained for other wireless fading models
(e.g., Nakagami fading) with path loss and shadowing. In
addition, we assume that the global channel state information
(CSI) of both the main links and wiretap links is available
in performing the multiuser scheduling, which is a common
assumption in the physical-layer security literature (e.g., [25]
and [26]). Notice that studying the case of the global CSI
available can provide a theoretical performance upper bound
on the achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmissions. We
will also examine the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme
that does not need the eavesdroppers’ CSI.
III. PROPOSED MULTIUSER SCHEDULING AND
ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we propose the multiuser scheduling scheme
to improve the physical-layer security of cognitive transmis-
sion and analyze its achievable secrecy rate. For the com-
parison purpose, the traditional multiuser scheduling and the
artificial noise approaches are also presented as benchmark
schemes. Numerical secrecy rate results are provided to show
the physical-layer security improvement by exploiting the
multiuser scheduling.
A. Proposed Multiuser Scheduling Scheme
This subsection presents the multiuser scheduling scheme to
defend against eavesdropping attacks. Given a spectrum band
available for the cognitive transmission, a CU among M CUs
should be selected and scheduled for its data transmission
to CBS. Without loss of generality, consider that CUi is
scheduled to transmit its signal xi to CBS. Assuming the
optimal Gaussian codebook used at CUi and using Eq. (2),
we can obtain the achievable rate at CBS as
Rb(i) = log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
), (4)
where Ui ∈ U . Meanwhile, from Eq. (3), the achievable rate
at eavesdropper Ej from CUi is given by
Rej (i) = log2(1 +
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
), (5)
where Ej ∈ E . Considering that N eavesdroppers indepen-
dently perform their interception tasks, the overall rate of the
wiretap links is the maximum of individual rates achieved at
N eavesdroppers. Thus, the overall rate Re(i) is the highest
one among Rej (i) for Ej ∈ E , yielding
Re(i) = max
Ej∈E
Rej (i) = max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
). (6)
As discussed in [13] and [14], the achievable secrecy rate is
shown as the difference between the capacities of the main
link and the wiretap link. Therefore, from Eqs. (4) and (6), the
achievable secrecy rate of cognitive transmission from CUi to
CBS in the presence of N eavesdroppers is obtained as
Rs(i) =
[
Rb(i)− max
Ej∈E
Rej (i)
]+
, (7)
where subscript s denotes ‘secrecy’ and [x]+ = max(x, 0).
In general, a CU with the highest achievable secrecy rate
should be selected as the optimal user and scheduled for
data transmission. Hence, from Eq. (7), the user scheduling
criterion can be given by
OptimalUser = argmax
i∈U
[
Cb(i)−max
j∈E
Cej (i)
]
= argmax
i∈U
[log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
)
− log2(1 + max
j∈E
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
)],
(8)
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where U represents the set of M CUs. One can observe from
Eq. (8) that not only the channel state information (CSI) of
main link hib, but also the wiretap link’s CSI hiej is considered
in performing the multiuser scheduling. Thus, from Eq. (8),
the achievable secrecy rate of proposed multiuser scheduling
scheme with M CUs in the presence of N eavesdroppers is
given by
RPs = max
i∈U


log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
)
−log2(1 + max
Ej∈E
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
)


+
, (9)
where superscript P denotes ‘proposed’. Notice that random
variables |hib|2, |hip|2 and |hiej |2 follow exponential dis-
tributions with means σ2ib, σ2ip and σ2iej , respectively. For
notational convenience, σ2ib and σ2iej are, respectively, denoted
by σ2ib = θibσ2m and σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e , where σ2m and σ2e represent
the reference channel gains of the main link and the wiretap
link, respectively. Moreover, let λme = σ2m/σ2e denote the ratio
of σ2m to σ2e , which is referred to as the main-to-eavesdropper
ratio (MER) throughout this paper. Denoting xi = |hib|2,
yi = |hip|2 and zij = |hiej |2, we can easily obtain an ergodic
secrecy rate of cognitive transmission from Eq. (9) as
C¯Ps =
∫∫
· · ·
∫
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(M+2)N
CPs
M∏
i=1
(
1
σ2ibσ
2
ip
N∏
j=1
1
σ2iej
)
× exp[−
M∑
i=1
(
xi
σ2ib
+
yi
σ2ip
+
N∑
j=1
zij
σ2iej
)]dxidyidzij ,
(10)
where xi > 0, yi > 0, and zij > 0. It needs to be pointed out
that obtaining a closed-form solution to the high dimensional
integral in Eq. (10) is challenging, however the ergodic secrecy
rate of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme can be
numerically determined through computer simulations.
B. Traditional Multiuser Scheduling Scheme
In this subsection, we present the traditional multiuser
scheduling scheme [19] as a benchmark scheme, where the
main objective is to maximize the achievable data rate at the
desired destination CBS without considering eavesdropping
attacks. Thus, in the traditional multiuser scheduling, a CU
that maximizes the achievable rate at CBS is viewed as the
optimal user among M CUs. Using Eq. (4), the traditional
multiuser scheduling criterion can be written as
OptimalUser = arg max
Ui∈U
Rb(i)
= arg max
Ui∈U
log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
),
(11)
from which the overall achievable rate at CBS using the
traditional multiuser scheduling scheme with M CUs is given
by
Rb = max
Ui∈U
log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
). (12)
For notational convenience, let ‘o’ denote the optimal CU that
is selected by the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme.
Similarly to Eq. (6), the overall achievable rate at N eaves-
droppers from the optimal CU is obtained as
Re = max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I|hoej |
2
|hop|2Nej
), (13)
where subscript ‘o’ denotes the optimal CU. Combining Eqs.
(12) and (13), the achievable secrecy rate of the traditional
multiuser scheduling scheme is given by
RTs =


max
Ui∈U
log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
)
−max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I|hoej |
2
|hop|2Nej
)


+
, (14)
where superscript T denotes ‘traditional’. Similarly to Eq.
(10), the ergodic secrecy rate of traditional multiuser schedul-
ing scheme can be obtained from Eq. (14) as
C¯Ts =
∫∫
· · ·
∫
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(M+2)N
CTs
M∏
i=1
(
1
σ2ibσ
2
ip
N∏
j=1
1
σ2iej
)
× exp[−
M∑
i=1
(
xi
σ2ib
+
yi
σ2ip
+
N∑
j=1
zij
σ2iej
)]dxidyidzij ,
(15)
where (xi, yi, zij) > 0 and RTs is given by Eq. (14).
C. Conventional Artificial Noise Scheme
This subsection presents the conventional artificial noise
scheme [21], [22] for the purpose of comparison with the user
scheduling approaches. The reasons for choosing the artificial
noise scheme for comparison are twofold: (1) The artificial
noise scheme is one of the most commonly used methods for
the wireless physical-layer security, which is often adopted as
the basis of comparison; (2) Although there are some different
anti-eavesdropping techniques (e.g., the artificial noise scheme
[21], [22], cooperative beamforming [27], resource allocation
[28], etc.), they each have their respective but complementary
advantages. Thus, for simplicity, we only consider the artificial
noise approach as the benchmark scheme. In the artificial noise
scheme, CUs are enabled to generate interfering signals (called
artificial noise) intelligently so that only the eavesdroppers are
adversely affected by the interfering signals while the intended
CBS is unaffected. It has been shown in [21] that such artificial
noise can be designed to interfere with the eavesdroppers only
without affecting the legitimate receiver, if and only if the
number of antennas at the legitimate transmitter is more than
the number of antennas at the legitimate receiver. Since all
nodes as shown in Fig. 1 are equipped with single antenna,
we consider that M CUs collaborate with each other and share
their antennas to form a virtual transmit antenna array, which
guarantees that the number of transmit antennas is larger than
the number of receive antennas at CBS for M ≥ 2. Without
loss of generality, we denote the desired signal by x which will
be transmitted to CBS through the virtual transmit antenna
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array. Meanwhile, the artificial noise vector is denoted by
w = (w1, w2, · · · , wi, · · · , wM ), where wi is to be transmitted
by CUi. Notice that in the artificial noise scheme, certain
transmit power should be allocated to produce artificial noise.
The simple equal power allocation between the desired signal
and the artificial noise is shown as a near-optimal and effective
strategy [21], which is used throughout this paper. Hence,
considering that M CUs simultaneously transmit the desired
signal x and the artificial noise vector w, the received signal
at CBS can be expressed as
yb =
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2
hibx+
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2
hibwi + nb, (16)
where Pi is the transmit power at CUi and nb is the AWGN
with zero mean and variance Nb. Since all CUs transmit
simultaneously, the total transmit power at CUs shall be
constrained to limit the interference received at PR. Given
the maximum tolerable interference I at PR and M CUs
simultaneously transmitting the desired signal and artificial
noise, the interference received at PU from each CU is limited
by I
M
for equal allocation. Thus, the transmit power at CUi,
Pi, is given by
Pi =
I
M |hip|2
, (17)
where hip represents the fading coefficient of the channel from
CUi to PU. Moreover, the artificial noise vector w should
be designed to interfere with the eavesdroppers only without
affecting the intended CBS, implying
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2
hibwi = 0, (18)
for w 6= 0. The artificial noise requirement as specified in Eq.
(18) can be easily satisfied when the number of CUs M ≥ 2.
Substituting Eqs. (17) and (18) into Eq. (16), we can obtain
the achievable rate at CBS as
Rb = log2(1 +
I
2MNb
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hib
|hip|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
). (19)
Meanwhile, the received signal at eavesdropper Ej is written
as
yej =
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2
hiejx+
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2
hiejwi + nej , (20)
where nej is a zero-mean AWGN noise of variance Nej re-
ceived at Ej . Since the wiretap channels hiej are independent
of the main channels hib, the artificial noise satisfying Eq. (18)
will result in harmful interference at the eavesdropper Ej , i.e.,
M∑
i=1
√
Pi
2 hiejwi 6= 0. Hence, the achievable rate at Ej can be
given by
Rej = log2(1 +
I
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2
I
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2 + 2MNej
), (21)
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Fig. 2. Achievable secrecy rate versus MER of the single user transmission,
the traditional multiuser scheduling, the artificial noise scheme, and the pro-
posed multiuser scheduling with M = 4, N = 2, I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm,
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from which the overall achievable rate at N eavesdroppers is
given by the highest one among Rej for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , yielding
Re = max
Ej∈E
Rej = max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I
∣∣∣∣M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2
I
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2 + 2MNej
).
(22)
Combining Eqs. (19) and (22), the achievable secrecy rate of
the artificial noise scheme is given by
RAs =


log2(1 +
I
2MNb
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hib
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2)
−max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2
I
∣∣∣∣M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2 + 2MNej
)


+
(23)
where superscript A stands for ‘artificial noise’. A closed-
form expression of the ergodic secrecy rate for the artificial
noise scheme can be derived by averaging out the random
variables hib, hiej and hip in Eq. (23), which is challenging
and cumbersome. Nevertheless, given the parameters M , N ,
I , Nb, Nej , σ
2
ib, σ
2
iej
and σ2ip, the ergodic secrecy rate may
be readily determined through computer simulations. So far,
we have completed the achievable secrecy rate analysis of
the multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes.
The following presents numerical secrecy rate results to show
the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling over the
traditional user scheduling and the artificial noise schemes.
D. Numerical Secrecy Rate Results
This subsection presents the numerical secrecy rate results
of the traditional multiuser scheduling, the artificial noise
scheme and the proposed multiuser scheduling. Fig. 2 shows
the achievable secrecy rate comparison among the single user
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transmission, the artificial noise scheme and the multiuser
scheduling approaches by using Eqs. (10), (15) and (23). It
is observed from Fig. 2 that in low MER region, the artificial
noise scheme performs better than both the traditional and
proposed multiuser scheduling approaches. As MER increases
beyond a critical value, the artificial noise scheme becomes
worse than the multiuser scheduling approaches, even worse
than the single user case in high MER region. This is because
that with an increasing MER, the wiretap link becomes much
weaker than the main link and the eavesdroppers will most
likely fail to intercept the legitimate transmissions. Therefore,
as MER increases, the eavesdroppers’ channel conditions
become worse and worse and thus it is unnecessary to generate
the artificial noise to confuse the eavesdroppers in high MER
region. However, the artificial noise scheme wastes some
power resources for producing the artificial noise, which
makes its achievable secrecy rate become lower than that of the
proposed multiuser scheduling scheme in high MER region. In
addition, one can see from Fig. 2 that the achievable secrecy
rate of the proposed multiuser scheduling is strictly higher
than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling across the
whole MER region, showing the advantage of the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme. Moreover, as MER increases,
the achievable secrecy rate improvement of the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme over the traditional multiuser
scheduling becomes less notable. This is due to the fact that
for sufficiently large MERs, the wiretap link is negligible as
compared with the main link and thus the achievable secrecy
rate at CBS through the main link dominates the achievable
secrecy rates of Eqs. (9) and (14), leading to the convergence
of the achievable secrecy rates between the proposed and
traditional multiuser scheduling schemes.
In Fig. 3, we show the achievable secrecy rate versus MER
of the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes
as well as the artificial noise approach for different number of
eavesdroppers N with M = 4 and I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm.
As shown in Fig. 3, for both cases of N = 2 and N = 8,
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy rate versus MER of the traditional multiuser
scheduling, the artificial noise scheme, and the proposed multiuser scheduling
for different number of CUs M with N = 2, I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm,
σ2
ib
= 0.8, σ2ip = 0.5, θib = 1, and θiej = 0.6.
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes
initially have lower secrecy rate than the artificial noise
scheme in low MER region. As MER continues increasing
beyond a certain value, the traditional and proposed multiuser
scheduling schemes finally outperform the artificial noise
scheme in terms of the achievable secrecy rate. Fig. 3 also
demonstrates that as the number of eavesdroppers increases
from N = 2 to N = 8, the achievable secrecy rates of
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes
are significantly reduced. In contrast, the achievable secrecy
rate of the artificial noise scheme decreases non-significantly.
This is because that the artificial noise scheme generates
significant interferences against eavesdropping attacks, which
makes its achievable secrecy rate robust to the eavesdroppers’
channel conditions. In addition, one can see from Fig. 3 that
the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme always performs
better than the traditional multiuser scheduling in terms of the
achievable secrecy rate, which further confirms the advantage
of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme.
Fig. 4 shows the achievable secrecy rate versus MER of
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes as
well as the artificial noise approach for different number of
CUs M with N = 2 and I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm. One
can observe from Fig. 4 that for both cases of M = 2 and
M = 8, the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and
proposed multiuser scheduling schemes are lower than that of
the artificial noise scheme in low MER region. However, when
MER is larger than a certain value and continues increasing,
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes
significantly outperform the artificial noise scheme in terms of
the achievable secrecy rate. It can also be seen from Fig. 4 that
as the number of CUs increases from M = 2 to M = 8, the
achievable secrecy rates of both the traditional and proposed
multiuser scheduling schemes increase significantly. Although
the secrecy rate of the traditional multiuser scheduling is lower
than that of the proposed multiuser scheduling, its secrecy rate
also improves as the number of CUs increases from M = 2
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to M = 8, showing the security enhancement of exploiting
multiuser scheduling even when the eavesdroppers’ CSI is
unavailable. Therefore, if the eavesdroppers’ CSI is unknown,
we can consider the use of traditional multiuser scheduling
scheme that does not require the eavesdroppers’ CSI. If the
eavesdroppers’ CSI becomes available, the proposed multiuser
scheduling would be a better choice.
IV. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH
FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we analyze the intercept probability of
the traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes
as well as the artificial noise scheme over Rayleigh fading
channels. We also provide numerical results on the intercept
probability to show the advantage of proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme over the traditional multiuser scheduling
and the artificial noise schemes.
A. Proposed Multiuser Scheduling Scheme
This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis
of proposed multiuser scheduling scheme. As discussed in
[12] and [13], an intercept event occurs when the achievable
secrecy rate of the main link becomes less than that of the
wiretap link. Thus, from Eq. (9), we can obtain an intercept
probability of the cognitive transmission with the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme as Eq. (24) at the top of the
following page. Notice that random variables |hib|2, |hip|2 and
|hiej |
2 are independent of each other for different CUi. Thus,
the intercept probability of proposed multiuser scheduling
scheme can be computed from Eq. (24) as
PPint =
M∏
i=1
Pr
(
|hib|2
Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
)
, (25)
where M is the number of CUs. Considering that |hib|2
and |hiej |2 are independent exponentially distributed random
variables with respective means σ2ib and σ2iej and letting
x = |hib|
2
, we can obtain
Pr
(
|hib|2
Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
)
= 1− Pr
(
max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
<
x
Nb
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
N∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
Nejx
Nbσ2iej
)]
1
σ2ib
exp(−
x
σ2ib
)dx,
(26)
where N is the number of eavesdroppers. Using the binomial
theorem, we can expand term
N∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
Nejx
Nbσ
2
iej
)] as
N∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
Nejx
Nbσ2iej
)]
= 1 +
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En| exp(−
∑
Ej∈En
Nejx
Nbσ2iej
),
(27)
where En is the n-th non-empty subcollection of N eavesdrop-
pers and |En| represents the cardinality of set En. Substituting
Eq. (27) into Eq. (26) and performing the integration yield
Pr
(
|hib|
2
Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
)
=
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(1 +
∑
Ej∈En
Nejσ
2
ib
Nbσ2iej
)−1.
(28)
Combining Eqs. (25) and (28), we obtain a closed-form ex-
pression of the intercept probability for the proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme as
PPint =
M∏
i=1

2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(1 +
∑
Ej∈En
Nejσ
2
ib
Nbσ2iej
)−1

. (29)
Denoting σ2ib = θibσ2m, σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e , and λme = σ2m/σ2e , the
preceding equation can be rewritten as
PPint =
M∏
i=1

2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(1 +
∑
Ej∈En
Nejθib
Nbθiej
λme)
−1

,
(30)
where λme = σ2m/σ2e is called main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER) throughout this paper.
B. Traditional Multiuser Scheduling Scheme
In this subsection, we analyze the intercept probability of
traditional multiuser scheduling scheme for the comparison
purpose. From Eqs. (12) and (13), an intercept probability of
the cognitive transmission relying on the traditional multiuser
scheduling scheme is given by
PTint = Pr(Rb < Re)
= Pr


max
Ui∈U
log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
)
< max
Ej∈E
log2(1 +
I|hoej |
2
|hop|2Nej
)

 , (31)
which can be further simplified to
PTint = Pr
[
max
Ui∈U
|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|hoej |
2
|hop|2Nej
]
. (32)
Although obtaining a general closed-form solution to Eq. (32)
for any M and N is difficult, numerical intercept probabilities
of the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme can be easily
determined through computer simulations. For illustration pur-
poses, the following presents the intercept probability analysis
for a special case with the single CU (i.e., M = 1). Substitut-
ing M = 1 into Eq. (32) gives
PTint = Pr
[
|h1b|
2
|h1p|2Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|h1ej |
2
|h1p|2Nej
]
= 1− Pr
[
|h1b|2
Nb
> max
Ej∈E
|h1ej |
2
Nej
]
.
(33)
Notice that random variables |h1b|2 and |h1ej |2 follow expo-
nential distributions with respective means σ21b and σ21ej and
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (ACCEPTED TO APPEAR) 8
PPint = Pr
{
max
Ui∈U
[
log2(1 +
I|hib|2
|hip|2Nb
)− log2(1 + max
Ej∈E
I|hiej |
2
|hip|2Nej
)
]
< 0
}
. (24)
are independent of each other. Denoting x = |h1b|2, we can
obtain
PTint = 1− Pr
[
x
Nb
> max
Ej∈E
|h1ej |
2
Nej
]
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
N∏
j=1
[1− exp(−
Nejx
σ21ejNb
)]
1
σ21b
exp(−
x
σ21b
)dx
=
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(1 +
∑
Ej∈En
Nejσ
2
1b
Nbσ21ej
)−1,
(34)
for M = 1, where the last equation is obtained by using
the binomial expansion formula, En is the n-th non-empty
subcollection of N eavesdroppers, and |En| represents the
cardinality of set En.
C. Conventional Artificial Noise Scheme
This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis
of the artificial noise scheme. Using Eq. (23), we obtain the
intercept probability of the artificial noise scheme as
PAint = Pr


I
2MNb
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hib
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2
< max
Ej∈E
I
∣∣∣∣M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2
I
∣∣∣∣M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2 + 2MNej


, (35)
which can be used to compute the numerical intercept proba-
bility of the artificial noise scheme. Moreover, using inequality
I
∣∣∣∣ M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣2 + 2MNej > 2MNej , we obtain an upper bound
on the intercept probability PAint as
PAint < Pr

 I
2MNb
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hib
|hip|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
< max
Ej∈E
I
2MNej
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣∣
2


= Pr

 1
Nb
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hib
|hip|
∣∣∣∣∣
2
< max
Ej∈E
1
Nej
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
i=1
hiej
|hip|
∣∣∣∣∣
2

 .
(36)
Considering a special case of M = 1, we can simplify Eq.
(36) as
PAint < Pr
[
|h1b|2
|h1p|2Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|h1ej |
2
|h1p|2Nej
]
. (37)
Substituting PTint = Pr
[
|h1b|
2
|h1p|2Nb
< max
Ej∈E
|h1ej |
2
|h1p|2Nej
]
from Eq.
(33) into Eq. (37) yields
PAint < P
T
int, (38)
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Fig. 5. Intercept probability versus MER of the traditional and proposed
multiuser scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise approach with
M = N = 4, I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm, σ2ib = σ2ip = 1, and θib = θiej =
1.
for M = 1. This theoretically proves the intercept probability
of the artificial noise scheme is strictly lower than that of
the traditional user scheduling scheme for M = 1. In what
follows, we show the numerical intercept probabilities of the
traditional and proposed user scheduling schemes as well as
the artificial noise approach.
D. Numerical Intercept Probability Results
This subsection presents the numerical results on intercept
probability of the traditional and proposed multiuser schedul-
ing schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme. In Fig.
5, we show the intercept probability versus MER of the
multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes with
M = N = 4 and I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm. It is seen
from Fig. 5 that the intercept probability of the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme is smaller than that of the tra-
ditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise schemes,
showing the advantage of the proposed multiuser scheduling
over the conventional approaches. Fig. 5 also shows that the
artificial noise scheme has lower intercept probability than
the traditional multiuser scheduling scheme, which confirms
the result of Eq. (38). In addition, Fig. 5 demonstrates that
that the slope of intercept probability curve of the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme in high MER region is much
steeper that that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the
artificial noise schemes. This means that with an increasing
MER, the intercept probability of the proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme is reduced at much higher speed than that
of the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise
schemes.
Fig. 6 shows the intercept probability versus MER of the
traditional and proposed multiuser scheduling schemes for
different number of CUs M with N = 4, where M = 4,
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Fig. 6. Intercept probability versus MER of the traditional and proposed
multiuser scheduling schemes for different number of CUs M with N = 4,
I = Nb = Nej = 0dBm, σ2ib = σ2ip = 1, and θib = θiej = 1.
M = 6 and M = 8 are considered for illustration. As shown
in Fig. 6, for all cases of M = 4, M = 6 and M = 8,
the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme significantly outper-
forms the traditional scheme in terms of intercept probability,
especially in high MER region. Also, as the number of CUs
increases from M = 4 to M = 8, the intercept probabilities of
the proposed and traditional multiuser scheduling schemes are
reduced significantly. Therefore, increasing the number of CUs
can effectively improve the security performance of cognitive
transmission. This confirms the security benefits by exploiting
the multiuser scheduling to defend against eavesdropping
attacks in cognitive radio networks.
V. DIVERSITY ORDER ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the diversity order of proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme to provide an insight into the
impact of the number of CUs on the intercept probability
performance of cognitive transmission in the presence of N
eavesdroppers. First, let us recall the definition of traditional
diversity order used to evaluate the wireless transmission
reliability performance in [29], which is given by
d = − lim
SNR→∞
logPe(SNR)
log SNR , (39)
where SNR stands for signal-to-noise ratio and Pe(SNR)
represents bit error rate (BER). In the geometric sense, the
traditional diversity order is to characterize the slope of BER
curve as SNR tends to infinity. However, in the presence
of eavesdropping attacks, the intercept probability is used
to evaluate the wireless security of cognitive transmission.
Moreover, it is observed from Eq. (30) that the intercept
probability is independent of signal power, which makes the
traditional diversity order definition become inapplicable to the
cognitive transmission scenario with multiple eavesdroppers.
Considering the fact that MER is a dominant factor in de-
termining the intercept probability of cognitive transmission,
we define a so-called security diversity as an asymptotic ratio
of the logarithmic intercept probability to logarithmic MER
λme with λme → ∞. Accordingly, the diversity order of the
proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is given by
d = − lim
λme→∞
log(PPint)
log(λme)
, (40)
where PPint represents the intercept probability of the pro-
posed multiuser scheduling scheme. Letting X = max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
wherein random variables |hiej |2 (j = 1, 2, · · · , N ) follow
independent exponential distributions with respective means
σ2iej , we obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
X as
PX(x) = Pr (X < x)
= Pr
(
max
Ej∈E
|hiej |
2
Nej
< x
)
=
N∏
j=1
[
1− exp(−
Nejx
σ2iej
)
]
,
(41)
which can be rewritten as
PX(x) = 1 +
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En| exp(−
∑
Ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
), (42)
where En is the n-th non-empty subcollection of N eaves-
droppers and |En| represents the cardinality of set En. From
Eq. (42), the probability density function (PDF) of X is given
by
pX(x) =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
∑
Ej∈En
Nej
σ2iej
exp(−
∑
Ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
).
(43)
Hence, using Eqs. (25) and (43), we can obtain PPint as
PPint =
M∏
i=1
Pr
(
|hib|2
Nb
< X
)
=
M∏
i=1
∫ ∞
0
[1− exp(−
Nbx
σ2ib
)]pX(x)dx.
(44)
Letting λme →∞ and using Appendix A, we have
1− exp(−
Nbx
σ2ib
) =
Nbx
σ2ib
+O(
1
λme
), (45)
where O( 1
λme
) represents high-order infinitesimals. Hence,
substituting Eqs. (43) and (45) into Eq. (44) and ignoring the
high-order terms yield
PPint =
M∏
i=1

2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
∫ ∞
0
Nb
σ2ib
exp(−
∑
Ej∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
)dx


=
M∏
i=1

2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(
∑
Ej∈En
Nejσ
2
ib
Nbσ2iej
)−1

,
(46)
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for λme →∞. Denoting σ2ib = θibσ2m and σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e and
letting λme →∞, we can rewrite PPint from Eq. (46) as
PPint =
M∏
i=1

2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(
∑
Ej∈En
Nejθib
Nbθiej
)−1

 ·( 1
λme
)M
.
(47)
One can observe from Eq. (47) that the intercept probability of
the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme behaves as ( 1
λme
)M
for λme →∞. Substituting Eq. (47) into Eq. (40) yields
d = M, (48)
which shows that the diversity order is the same as the number
of CUs, implying the full diversity achieved by the proposed
multiuser scheduling scheme. One can also see from Eq.
(48) that the diversity order is independent of the number
of eavesdroppers, i.e., the security diversity of proposed mul-
tiuser scheduling scheme is insusceptible to the number of
eavesdroppers. To be specific, although increasing the number
of eavesdroppers would definitely degrade the intercept prob-
ability performance, it won’t affect the speed at which the
intercept probability decreases as λme → ∞. In contrast, as
the number of CUs increases, the slope of intercept probability
curve of the proposed multiuser scheduling becomes steeper
as λme → ∞ in the geometric sense. In other words, as
λme → ∞, the intercept probability of proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme decreases at faster speed with an increasing
number of CUs. Therefore, exploiting multiuser scheduling
can effectively improve the physical-layer security of cognitive
transmission to defend against eavesdropping attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the physical-layer security
of cognitive transmissions in the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers and proposed the multiuser scheduling scheme to
improve the cognitive transmission security against eavesdrop-
ping attacks. For the comparison purpose, we have studied
the traditional multiuser scheduling and the artificial noise ap-
proach as benchmark schemes. We have analyzed the achiev-
able secrecy rates of the traditional and proposed multiuser
scheduling schemes as well as the artificial noise scheme with
a maximum tolerable interference constraint for the primary
QoS protection. It has been shown that given a primary QoS
constraint, the achievable secrecy rates of the traditional and
proposed multiuser scheduling schemes are smaller than that
of the artificial noise scheme in low MER region. As MER
increases beyond a critical value, both the traditional and
proposed multiuser scheduling schemes have higher achievable
secrecy rates than the artificial noise scheme. Moreover, the
proposed multiuser scheduling scheme always outperforms the
traditional multiuser scheduling in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate. We have also derived the closed-form intercept
probability expressions of the multiuser scheduling and the
artificial noise schemes and demonstrated that the intercept
performance of the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme is
better than that of the traditional multiuser scheduling and
the artificial noise schemes. In addition, we have examined
the diversity order performance through an asymptotic inter-
cept probability analysis and shown that the full diversity
is achieved by the proposed multiuser scheduling scheme,
showing the advantage of exploiting multiuser scheduling for
enhancing the cognitive transmission security against eaves-
dropping attacks.
It is worth mentioning that in this paper, we have not con-
sidered user fairness in the multiuser scheduling for improving
the cognitive radio security against eavesdropping attacks. For
example, if a cognitive user experiences severe propagation
loss in a shadow fading environment, it will be rarely sched-
uled for accessing the channel by using the proposed multiuser
scheduling scheme, causing a long channel access delay. It is
thus of high practical interest to extend the results of this
paper e.g. using the QoS guaranteed user scheduling (e.g.,
the proportional fair scheduling [30]). More specifically, user
fairness should be further considered in the QoS guaranteed
scheduling, attempting to maximize the achievable secrecy rate
while at the same time guaranteeing each user with certain
opportunities to access the channel. We will leave the above
interesting problem for our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQ. (45)
For notational convenience, we denote t = Nbx
σ2
ib
where the
PDF of random variable x is given by Eq. (31). The mean of
t is expressed as
E(t) =
∫ ∞
0
Nbx
σ2ib
pX(x)dx. (A.1)
Substituting Eq. (43) into Eq. (A.1) yields
E(t) =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)
|En|+1(
∑
j∈En
Nejσ
2
ib
Nbσ2iej
)−1. (A.2)
Denoting σ2ib = θibσ2m and σ2iej = θiejσ
2
e , we have
E(t) =
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(
∑
j∈En
Nejθib
Nbθiej
)−1 ·
1
λme
, (A.3)
where λme = σ2m/σ2e . One can observe from Eq. (A.3) that
E(t) approaches to zero for λme → ∞. Meanwhile, using
Eq. (43), we can obtain the mean of t2 as Eq. (A.4) at the top
of the following page, which shows that E(t2) approaches to
zero for λme → ∞. Since both E(t) and E(t2) approach to
zero as λme →∞, we can easily obtain that random variable t
approaches to zero with probability one for λme →∞. Hence,
considering t→ 0 with probability one and using Taylor series
expansion, we obtain
exp(−t) = 1− t+O(
1
λme
), (A.5)
for λme →∞, where O( 1λme ) represents high-order infinites-
imals. Substituting t = Nbx
σ2
ib
into Eq. (A.5) gives
exp(−
Nbx
σ2ib
) = 1−
Nbx
σ2ib
+O(
1
λme
),
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E(t2) =
∫ ∞
0
N2b x
2
σ4ib
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
∑
j∈En
(
Nej
σ2iej
) exp(−
∑
j∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
)dx
=
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1
∫ ∞
0
N2b x
2
σ4ib
∑
j∈En
(
Nej
σ2iej
) exp(−
∑
j∈En
Nejx
σ2iej
)dx
= 2
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(
∑
j∈En
Nejσ
2
ib
Nbσ2iej
)−2
= 2
2N−1∑
n=1
(−1)|En|+1(
∑
j∈En
Nejθib
Nbθiej
)−2 · (
1
λme
)2,
(A.4)
which in turn leads to
1− exp(−
Nbx
σ2ib
) =
Nbx
σ2ib
+O(
1
λme
), (A.6)
which completes the proof of Eq. (45).
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